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14 Ibid. i65. the 'Gyziquoas', a hybrid group of Khoi and Tswana who were the middle-men in a well-established trade between their two parent peoples.15 They also maintained a system of patronage over various groups described as 'Bushmen' or San, who were generally without stock, except when they stole it, and who lived a primarily hunting and gathering existence away from the river.
The way of life that Wikar described was not peaceful. There were occasional tribal wars which were mainly concerned with the capture of stock, though any prisoners captured were likely to be killed in a particularly bloodthirsty way.16 Nevertheless, the original inhabitants could not cope with the lawlessness that the spread of the influence of the Cape Colony brought to the Orange River in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Already by the time of Wikar's journey, the region north-east of Pella had been ravaged by raiders partly under the leadership of a Bastard called Cupido Roggeveld, who was probably based in Namaqualand.17 But the real destruction came later, when colonial frontiersmen began systematic raids on the middle Orange. Most notable of these was in I768 when, intervening in a struggle between two Khoisan leaders, a party under the burghers Adriaan van Zyl, Pieter Pienaar and Jan Bloem attacked the Eyniqua.18 Thereafter raids became frequent, and when Jager Afrikaner established himself near the Aughrabies falls this developed into a major campaigning zone, as Boer farmers wished both to avenge the murder of one of their number, Pienaar, by Afrikaner who had been his client and to capture the stock Afrikaner had gathered.19 In due course, Jager Afrikaner's following split; a section remained in southern Namibia, and became increasingly settled and Christian, a section moved north to the richer raiding grounds of the Herero. By this time, however, the old riverine communities had been dispersed, so that the tribal entities that Wikar described among the Eyniqua were almost forgotten. 20 In the confusion that marked the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the area of the middle Orange lay midway between the main foci of power on the northern border of the Cape Colony, in Griqualand and in Namaqualand, so that no stable government could arise to replace the order finally destroyed by Jager Afrikaner and his followers. There are other [groups] of natives in that direction that would with difficulty be attached to colonial interests, namely the Bushmen and the Coran.nas. They are widely scattered over the extensive flat which lies between the colony and the Orange River and from the circumstance of their trusting principally to the production of the soil and to hunting for support they have nothing like fixed abodes. They associate in small groups-each carries on its operations independently and no-one recognises the right of any other to interfere with it. No regular chiefs are acknowledged except on particular occasions, hence generally speaking each individual follows his own propensities and every party makes war or makes peace just as meets its individual purpose. Hence no security can exist where interests are so divided, and the colony can never reckon on being on friendly relations with the Bushmen and Corannas until they have treated with them individually or brought them to form tribes and elect chiefs to manage their more important concerns.
Independent of the obstacles which so disjointed a state of society would present, there are other circumstances which would powerfully oppose the immediate success of any endeavour to establish peace and order on the Bushman flat. Both the Corannas and the Bushmen have for many years past been regarded as the determined enemies of every peaceable community around them and they in turn regard all such as equally hostile to them.21
On the other hand, in the few years around I830, the San raids were generally recognized as being the consequence of particularly severe dearth, and were thus regarded with more tolerance, although they hit the farmers at times which were severe for them as well. 22 By the I830s, the old raiding existence was no longer possible in much of the Orange Free State and Griqualand West. As may be exemplified by the defeat of Bergenaar rebels against Andries Waterboer in I828, the settled communities, whether Boer or Griqua, had become stronger, so that increasing numbers of people who did not consider the new way of life suitable for them began to move down river to the island fortresses. Only rarely is it possible to describe their movements or their motives in any detail. Nevertheless, some instances can be given. Already by I8I3 The expeditions against Stuurman all found it difficult to penetrate the dense bush of the Orange, and to find any adversaries to destroy. The first commando, launched from Graaf Reinet in the wake of the Baggerspoort murders, with the assistance of Waterboer, had to be abandoned because the burghers began to run low on ammunition.30 Waterboer followed this 25 Van Ryneveld to Chief Sec. to Government, 2I Oct. I832, CA, G.R. I6/52. It should be mentioned that the Griqua were a substantial 'coloured' group which was settled over a wide area north of the Orange river, from the edge of the desert to the borders of Lesotho. By the I830s, the two main foci of power were at Griquatown in the west, under Kaptyn Andries Waterboer, and at Philippolis in the southern Orange Free State, under Adam Kok II, although there were others, as at Campbell, near Griquatown, under Cornelis Kok II. During the I820S, these Captaincies were challenged by the rebellion of the Bergenaars, who, at least in part, had very much the same aims as the !Kora, and were often undistinguishable from them, as in the attack on Kuruman in I828 After the defeat of Stuurman, there was no other major incursion into the colony for thirty years, although there were occasional scares of San raids.35 There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, the colonial farmers did not penetrate far north of the mountains into Bushmanland, and thus their herds were not so great a temptation. The Bastards who did settle at various permanent springs in the north always tended to live in sufficiently large numbers to make raids on them a more serious business. More importantly, from the I830S onwards, a more profitable raiding field had opened up. For a period of about twenty years, the various Oorlam groups36 of southern and central Namibia were able to prey on the herds of the Herero and even of the Ovambo to the north, trading the captured stock down to Walvisch Bay for guns, ammunition and liquor. In particular, Jonker Afrikaner, the most successful of these raiders, who was able to transform himself into the overlord of central Namibia, was always short of men.37 In these conditions, the potential raiders of the Orange River generally moved north, leaving the northern border of the colony unmolested.
By the i86os, however, both these safeguards had been eroded. Lastly, in the area between the Orange River and Griquatown, was a small group known as the Bovenstanders (literally 'those standing above') under three chieftains, Jan, Willem and Jacob. As their name suggests, this tribe had once been the senior of the !Kora proprement dits, but by the i86os they had been reduced by war and smallpox to a position of Adam and a Scots trader, Hugh MacPherson, were robbed on the southern bank of the Orange.47 From then on tension slowly began to increase, so that during I867 San bands were reported to be roaming and robbing on the borders of Namaqualand with impunity.48 In May of that year, a commando of burghers and Bastards from Fraserburg and Victoria West were sent against the !Kora of the Hartebeest River who were considered to be the most active raiders. It was successful in that it captured Piet Rooi, along with three other !Kora, and repulsed the attack which his comrades made in an attempt to release him. However, the !Kora could not be crushed then, as the burghers were forbidden to follow them when they moved out of the colony, which then had the Orange as its northern border.49 Rooi was therefore held a prisoner in Fraserburg, where it was surprisingly found that no definite charge could be laid against him, so that he had to be released without trial.50 From then on the !Kora raids became increasingly frequent, as the maltreatment which Rooi had suffered stung them into action. Throughout the last quarter of I867 and the first half of i868, burghers throughout the area north of the mountains complained of losing their cattle and sheep to !Kora incursions.51 The Bastard community that centred round the mission station at De Tuin was particularly badly hit, and it was these raids, coming on top of long-standing pressure from Boer farmers who coveted their permanent water supply and their extensive grazing, which caused them to trek away deep into Namibia to settle at Rehoboth.52 At the same time, marauders, who, being in much smaller groups and without horses, were known as Bushmen, kept up a series of raids into Little Namaqualand, effectively tying up any help that might have come to the farmers in Bushmanland from that direction.53 But it was the !Kora under Rooi and Kivido who were the most wide-ranging and effective raiders. By the end of the winter, the resident magistrate at Calvinia reported that 'the country between Calvinia and the Orange River is almost totally deserted by the farmers, and it is very easy for a band of Korana marauders to approach within an easy distance of the village without discovery'. In fact there were claims that one hundred !Kora were within nine hours of Calvinia, and that three hundred were within two days, and were carrying off large numbers of sheep, cattle, horses, guns and wagons. 54 The colonial government was wary of sending a commando against the San and the !Kora because experience had shown the danger that the Boers and Bastards would commit atrocities on their adversaries.55 A Special Magistracy over the northern border was therefore set up at Kenhardt, in order to maintain the peace and protect the lives and property of colonial subjects in the north.56 The Special Magistrate had at his disposal a force of Frontier Armed and Mounted Police, so that he did not have to rely on the dangerous and uncertain help of the burghers. This force, however, could not assemble quickly enough to cope with the immediate threat. A commando was therefore organized from Calvinia district. About three hundred men moved north to the River and attempted to storm the island fortress of Rooi and Kivido.57 They were unsuccessful, although they killed thirteen men, including Jan Kivido, and signed a treaty with Cupido Pofadder, both to strengthen him against his !Kora rivals and to help him protect the frontier of the colony.58
Neither the commando nor the treaty deterred the !Kora. Secure in the knowledge that no further assault could be launched for many months, at least until the waters of the Orange had subsided enough to allow their opponents to cross to the islands,59 they sallied forth almost immediately, descending on those farmers who had dared to move into the summer trekveld of Bushmanland. They boasted that they were strong enough to attack even the dorps of Calvinia and Fraserburg,60 and certainly raided far up both the Zak and the Hartebeest rivers, lifting, so the farmers claimed, well over ten thousand sheep.61 Initially the establishment of the border magistracy did little to contain the situation, as the magistrate had a force of only fifty men, many of whose horses were quickly put out of action.62 The presence of a permanent force to counter them does, however, seem to have had the effect, at least, of making the MKora more cautious and less prepared to leave their bases and their lines of communication open to attack. The first concrete defeat for the raiders occurred when Willem Ruiters, who had succeeded Klein Pofadder (alias Gert Ruiters) as chief of the 'Novango' section, was captured by Cupido Pofadder, and handed over to the Special Magistrate, Jackson.63 Nevertheless, throughout the first half of I869, there were frequent skirmishes between the !Kora and the F.A.M.P., and at least one sizeable battle, when a very large group of !Kora were attacked at De Tuin. Fortified behind the stone walls of the missionary institution, they were able to hold off the Police and retire to the Orange with their loot.
By this time it was clear that no force could effectively patrol a I50 kilometer frontier across which !Kora raids could be launched at almost any point.64 A major operation was required to evict Piet Rooi and his colleagues from the islands, for there was no other way in which the security of the northern border could be maintained. If the frontier could not be secured, then a large tract of country from Namaqualand to Fraserburg, which was necessary for the prosperity of the population, both Boer and Bastard, would have to be abandoned. Thus during the course of I869 a major expedition was led by Sir Walter Currie against the islands. He had a force of over three hundred men, of whom I68 were members of the border police. Nevertheless, the attempts to storm the islands were unsuccessful. The troops found that they could take any island to which they could walk, despite the defensive barricades which the !Kora had erected. However, this was costly, as one or two lives were generally lost, while there was no tangible result, as the !Kora could never be seen in the deep bush.65 Currie himself, a veteran of long experience on the Eastern Frontier, 'a born fighter-as hard and tough as possible [who] could ride with or without saddle, go with or without boots, but ... could not move along without adjectives',66 died in consequence of a fever he caught on the river. It became obvious that the !Kora could only be defeated by starvation, and thus the force held off in order to maintain a state of siege on the islands. In the event, during the last quarter of the year, the colonial authorities were able to 'bribe Klaas Lucas and Cupido Pofadder to act against the other clans engaged'.67 After Lucas had been persuaded to cut off supplies to Rooi and his colleagues, he managed to trap them and capture Rooi and most of his leading henchmen. They were handed over to the Special Magistrate, and were sent to Robben Island. Those who escaped moved north into Namibia, or towards the Vaal River. A total of 148 !Kora and San were apprehended in dubious circumstances, while a further 271 'natives', who had been reduced to destitution by the campaign, were sent out to service. As Jackson commented, 'the marauding tribes have been completely rooted out'. 68 In the aftermath of the war, the colonial government concluded treaties with Cupido Pofadder and Lucas. According to their terms, the chiefs were to maintain the security of the border, sending back to the colony any cattle coming over the river. They were not to settle on any of the islands, but only north of the northernmost stream of the Orange. In return they were to receive subsidies of powder and lead.69 They were thus confirmed in their hegemony over the !Kora of the northern border. However, the destruction of the major raiding parties based on the islands and the elimination of the San of Bushmanland allowed farmers to move north to the Orange, and thus destroyed the basis of their old way of life. A combination of pressures began to be exerted on the !Kora. Some were merely symbolic, as when the Dutch Reformed Church established missions at Lucas's kraal at Upington and at Kakamas, on the edge of Pofadder's territory.70 Others were more real. As travel in the area became safe, traders began to move in, selling alcohol, for which they could find a ready market, as among all demoralized and broken peoples. Following on the 'Cape Smoke' came indebtedness, in the cycle that had already destroyed so many Khoikhoin tribes. The chiefs were aware of the danger, but they could do nothing about it. Powerlessly, they watched the resources of their people disappearing.
To make matters worse, during a period of drought around I873, a large number of colonial Bastards began moving north of the river.71 As they took their flocks north, they occupied and quickly exhausted the best pastures, although they do seem to have paid a certain amount of rent to the !Kora chiefs.72 At any rate, the !Kora seem to have believed, probably rightly, that they were 'going to the wall' because of competition from the Bastards. Nor could they move off; to their north was only the Kalahari desert, and even there the best living sites were now occupied by Bastards, under Dirk Vilander. The experiences and the attitudes which formed the heritage of the !Kora did not fit them for competition with the Bastards, because anyone both willing and capable to act successfully within the colonial economy would probably already have 'become' a Bastard. Moreover, the stereotypes that the traders had of the !Kora were such that they behaved in a way which helped to confirm their own opinions of the !Kora. For a while, then, those who had not been forced to become farm labourers, either because they were destitute, or because they had been Despite the pressures on them, the !Kora chieftains74 did not take up arms again against the colony for several years. Nor did they do so on their own initiative. In I878, the war on the Eastern Frontier was exacerbated by a revolt in Griqualand West and among the Ngqika Xhosa whose two generations in Schietfontein (modern Carnarvon) and Prieska had not robbed them of the memory of their tribal affiliations, and who had been badly hit by the division among the Boers of the common land on which they had lived.75 Seeing the garrison of F.A.M.P. march away, receiving promptings from Griqua leaders and responding to a panic among the Bastards, who trekked back south of the river, the !Kora re-occupied the the islands, stealing as many of the Bastards' cattle as they could.76 Apparently they believed that they would be able to defend the islands as there were now no other !Kora to betray them as they had betrayed Piet Rooi a decade earlier.77 In this view they were mistaken. Once they were able to gather for the task, the colonial forces were slowly able to expel them. As one of the leaders of the force reported:
The work on the islands was of a most trying character. 'The islands' is really a tract of forest jungle some fifty miles long and from two to six miles wide, intersected by innumerable streams, almost all unfordable, and many of them swift as mill races. Not a man in the force knew anything accurately about these streams, nor how any particular island had to be reached. The enemy had to be groped for, streams waded or swum, and that in face of intrenchments held by the enemy, and our force was unprovided with light boats, lines, or other appliances for such work.78
The operation was necessarily expensive, costing the Cape government over ,ioo,ooo, as much as was needed to reduce the stronghold of the Sotho chief Morosi.79 Nevertheless, the last fortress was finally captured and the !Kora were forced to flee into the desert. The lands along the river were given out to settlers, Bastard, Dutch and English.80
With the final clearing of the islands, the MKora more or less disappeared as a group. By the middle of this century, a physical anthropologist could only find about three hundred people who considered themselves to be descendants of the MKora, for being a '!Kora' no longer had any meaning. It was perhaps inevitable that the Cape Colony would find it necessary to eliminate a group whose ethos was in no way compatible with its own, but it was also inevitable that the !Kora were unable to accommodate to the Colony and find a niche within its society. Although it is impossible to be certain, it would appear that very many of those who were !Kora, and who fought in what were known as the 'Korana Wars', had taken the decision to become so at some stage in their lives, rather than being born to it. At the very least, they had the option of ceasing to 'be' !Kora, by giving up the life-style that that entailed. By the Io88s, a roving raiding way of life was an anachronism, as was shown by the defeat at the battle of Schweizer-Reinecke of those NKora who had remained on the south-west border of Transvaal. The very bases of !Kora social organization had brought them into a conflict with white South Africa which, in the long run, they could not hope to win.
SUMMARY
This article argues that the !Kora, an essentially Khoisan group in central South Africa, consisted not of hereditary tribes, but of people who had chosen a predatory, raiding way of life. It then traces the history of those IKora who were based on the jungle-covered islands of the middle Orange river, concentrating particularly on the three wars that occurred between them and the Cape Colony: in I832-4, when the IKora were led by Stuurman, i868-9, when they were under Piet Rooi and Jan Kivido, and the final episodes during I879-80. Pointing out the difficulty that the colonial forces had in reducing the islands, it shows how the !Kora were able to raid up to 250 kilometers across the Bushmanland Flats, and thus make colonial subsistence over a wide area of the northern Cape Colony non-viable. Nevertheless, it argues that the way of life that the MKora had chosen could not be sustained in face of the consolidation of colonial society, and describes the processes whereby they were destroyed.
